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Sober	as	a	Judge†	
		 Gordon	Belot‡			Elliott	Sober	has	a	longstanding	interest	in	delimiting	the	epistemic	(as	opposed	to	pragmatic	 or	 aesthetic)	 relevance	 of	 parsimony	 considerations.	 He	 tells	 us	 in	 his	marvelous	 new	 book,	 Ockham’s	 Razors,	 that	 his	 goal	 	 “is	 to	 determine	 when	parsimony	is	relevant	and	when	it	is	not.	It	 is	obvious	that	simple	theories	may	be	beautiful	 and	 easy	 to	 remember	 and	 understand.	 The	 hard	 problem	 is	 to	 explain	why	 the	 fact	 that	one	 theory	 is	 simpler	 than	another	 tells	 you	anything	about	 the	way	the	world	is”	(2).		This	is	a	ferociously	difficult	problem—and	although	it	lies	at	the	 heart	 of	much	 of	 contemporary	 philosophy	 of	 science	 and	 epistemology,	 it	 is	embarrassingly	 often	 complacently	 shirked	 rather	 than	 confronted.	 Few	philosophers	have	worked	so	hard,	judiciously,	and	productively	on	the	problem	as	Sober	has—and		Ockham’s	Razors	provides	an	invaluable	synthesis	and	overview	of	this	work.			At	 the	 core	 of	 Ockham’s	 Razors	 is	 the	 fascinating	 analysis	 in	 Chapter	 2	 of	 two	“parsimony	 paradigms.”	 According	 to	 the	 first,	 data	 often	 favour	 simpler	hypotheses,	in	the	sense	of	conferring	higher	likelihoods	on	them	than	on	their	more	complex	 rivals.	 According	 to	 the	 second,	 data	 often	 favour	 simpler	 models	 over	more	complex	ones,	“because	the	number	of	adjustable	parameters	in	a	model	helps	you	to	estimate	its	predictive	accuracy”	(141).			My	 focus	 here	will	 be	 on	 the	 second	 of	 these	 paradigms.	 Sober’s	 picture	 is	 nicely	encapsulated	 in	 the	 following	passage,	discussing	a	number	of	 related	methods	of	model	 selection:	 “they	 agree	 that	 parsimony,	 as	 measured	 by	 the	 number	 of	adjustable	parameters	in	a	model,	is	relevant	to	making	those	estimates.	It	isn’t	just	that	 parsimony	 seems	 relevant;	 there	 are	 mathematical	 arguments	 for	 why	 it	 is	relevant.	 Ockham’s	 razor	 is	 alive	 and	 well	 in	 statistics.”	 (141)	 The	 mathematical	results	 in	 question	 establish	 that	 certain	 methods	 of	 model	 selection	 enjoy	 good	asymptotic	 behaviour—e.g.,	 some	are	 essentially	 guaranteed	 to	 achieve	predictive	accuracy	in	the	limit	of	large	data	sets.			So	we	have	an	appealing	argument:	certain	methods	are	good	methods	for	achieving	predictive	accuracy	because	they	enjoy	good	asymptotic	behaviour;	 	because	these	methods	 take	 account	 of	 the	 number	 of	 variables	 in	 a	 model,	 parsimony	 is	epistemically	 relevant	 for	 those	 interested	 in	 predictive	 accuracy.	 I	 would	 like	 to	raise	some	worries	about	this	form	of	argument—and	this	to	take	this	opportunity	to	 become	 more	 clear	 about	 the	 structure	 of	 Sober’s	 thought	 about	 his	 second	parsimony	paradigm.																																																												†	Forthcoming	in	Metascience,	in	a	symposium	on	Sober’s	Ockham’s	Razors:	A	User’s	Guide.	‡	Department	of	Philosophy,	University	of	Michigan.	belot@umich.edu	
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	A	GENTLE	WARMUP		It	will	be	helpful	to	begin	with	something	simple.	Suppose	that	a	coin	is	to	be	tossed	once	a	day.	After	each	toss	you	are	told	the	outcome	(0=tails,	1=heads)	and	asked	to	put	 forward	 a	 conjecture	 as	 to	 the	 bias	 p	 of	 the	 coin	 in	 favour	 of	 heads	 (i.e.,	 the	chance	p	of	the	coin	coming	up	heads	on	any	given	toss).	A	method	for	approaching	this	 problem	 is	 a	 function	 from	 finite	 binary	 sequences	 to	 possible	 values	 for	 the	bias	of	the	coin.			One	natural	method	for	handling	this	problem	is	the	straight	rule:	if	you	have	seen	k	heads	in	m	tosses,	conjecture	that	the	bias	in	favour	of	heads	is	k/m.		A	signal	virtue	of	 this	 method	 is	 that	 it	 is	 virtually	 guaranteed	 to	 lead	 you	 to	 the	 truth.	 	 More	precisely,	it	is	statistically	consistent:	whatever	the	true	bias	of	the	coin,	there	is	zero	chance	that	a	data	stream	will	be	generated	that	when	fed	to	the	straight	rule	would	result	in	a	sequence	of	conjectures	that	failed	to	converge	to	the	true	bias.			Now	consider	the	following	question:	Is	the	order	of	heads	and	tails	in	a	data	set—in	addition	to	their	proportions—relevant	to	the	problem	of	determining	the	bias	of	a	coin?		Fans	 of	 the	 straight	 rule	may	be	 tempted	 to	 argue	 for	 the	 irrelevance	 of	 order	 as	follows.		The	 straight	 rule	 has	 good	 asymptotic	 behaviour	 for	 this	 problem—it	 is	statistically	consistent.	So	 it	 is	a	good	method	 for	determining	 the	bias	of	a	coin.	But	the	straight	rule	cares	only	about	the	proportions	of	heads	and	tails	in	 a	 data	 set,	 not	 about	 the	 order	 in	 which	 they	 occur.	 So	 order	 is	epistemically	irrelevant	to	the	problem	of	determining	the	bias	of	a	coin.			Now,	 statistical	 consistency	 is	 a	 substantive	 condition:	 many	 methods	 for	approaching	our	problem	are	 statistically	 inconsistent	 (e.g.,	making	 conjectures	at	random;	or	remaining	certain	 that	 the	coin	 is	 fair,	no	matter	what	data	 is	seen;	or	throwing	away	every	second	bit	of	data	and	then	applying	the	straight	rule).			But	 because	 it	 cares	 only	 about	 behavior	 in	 the	 infinite	 long	 run,	 statistical	consistency	 is	 in	 a	 sense	 a	 very	weak	 requirement.	 Any	method	 for	 our	 problem	whose	conjectures	tend	to	converge	to	those	of	the	straight	rule	will	be	statistically	consistent.	There	are	many	such	methods—some	of	which	care	about	the	order	of	heads	and	tails	in	a	data	set	as	well	as	about	their	proportions.			Consider	the	unprimed	straight	rule:	given	a	data	set	(x1,	…,	xm)	first	discard	the	bits	with	prime	indices	(i.e.,	discard	x2,	x3,	x5,	x7,	and	so	on),	then	apply	the	straight	rule	to	 the	 resulting	data	 set	 (x1,	x4,	x6,	x8,	…).	 For	 any	data	 stream,	 the	 outputs	 of	 the	unprimed	straight	rule	will	converge	to	a	number	p	if	and	only	if	the	outputs	of	the	straight	 rule	 do	 so.	 So	 the	 unprimed	 straight	 rule	 is	 statistically	 consistent.	 But	unlike	the	straight	rule,	the	unprimed	straight	rule	cares	about	order:	shown	01010,	
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it	applies	the	straight	rule	to	01	and	conjectures	that	the	bias	of	the	coin	is	.5;	shown	10010,	it	applies	the	straight	rule	to	11	and	conjectures	that	the	bias	of	the	coin	is	1.			If	the	argument	above	for	the	irrelevance	of	order	is	good,	then	so	is	the	following	argument	for	the	relevance	of	order:		The	 unprimed	 straight	 rule	 has	 good	 asymptotic	 behaviour	 for	 this	problem—it	is	statistically	consistent.	So	it	is	a	good	method	for	determining	the	bias	of	a	 coin.	But	 	 the	unprimed	straight	 rule	 cares	about	 the	order	 in	which	heads	and	tails	occur	in	a	data	set	as	well	as	about	their	proportions.	So	order	is	epistemically	relevant	to	the	problem	of	determining	the	bias	of	a	coin.		How	 can	 we	 avoid	 the	 conclusion	 that	 order	 both	 is	 and	 isn’t	 relevant	 to	 the	problem	of	determining	the	bias	of	a	coin?	There	are	a	number	of	options.	We	could	relativize	 relevance	 to	 commitment	 to	 a	 method—order	 is	 relevant	 for	 those	committed	 to	 the	 unprimed	 straight	 rule,	 irrelevant	 for	 those	 committed	 to	 the	straight	 rule.	 Relatedly,	 we	 could	 avail	 ourselves	 of	 the	 resources	 of	 subjective	Bayesianism.	Or	we	 could	 deny	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 a	 good	method	 for	 our	 problem	takes	a	certain	consideration	into	account	suffices	to	show	that	that	consideration	is	epistemically	relevant	 to	our	problem.	Each	of	 these	 is	an	 interesting	option.	But	 I	will	set	them	aside	here,	on	the	grounds	that	they	are	alien	to	Sober’s	approach.		But	there	is	another	option:	we	could	deny	that	statistical	consistency	is	a	sufficient	condition	 for	 the	 goodness	 of	 a	 method.	 This	 gambit	 has	 deep	 roots	 in	 Sobriety.	Indeed,	in	considering	a	problem	similar	to	our	coin	problem	(namely,	the	problem	of	 determining	 the	mean	 height	 of	 a	 population	 from	 samples),	 Sober	 has	 argued	that	statistical	consistency	is	too	weak	to	be	plausibly	regarded	as	being	a	sufficient	condition	 for	 a	 method	 to	 be	 reasonable,	 and	 suggested	 that	 further	 asymptotic	considerations	such	as	efficiency	and	lack	of	bias	should	be	used	to	single	out	those	statistically	consistent	methods	that	are	genuinely	reasonable	(Sober	1988,	229).			However,	 there	are	ample	grounds	 to	suspect	 that	considerations	of	 this	kind	will	fail	to	single	out	an	elite	class	of	statistically	consistent	methods	that	agree	on	such	questions	 as	 whether	 order	 is	 relevant	 in	 determining	 the	 bias	 of	 a	 coin.	 For	instance:	 	while	 the	straight	rule	 is	unbiased	and	 in	an	 interesting	sense	optimally	efficient,	 there	 are	many	 other	 unbiased	methods	 optimally	 efficient	 in	 the	 same	sense,	including	some	that	take	order	into	account	(Juhl	1994).		
	
	SOBER	ON	PARSIMONY	AND	MODEL	SELECTION		Sober	 is	 interested	 in	 the	 problem	 that	 statisticians	 call	 model	 selection.	 For	concreteness,	let	us		suppose	that	an	infinite	binary	sequence	will	be	revealed	to	us	one	bit	at	a	time.	A	statistical	hypothesis	is	a	hypothesis	about	how	this	data	stream	is	 being	 generated	 (i.e.,	 a	 probability	 distribution	 over	 possible	 data	 streams).	 A	
model	of	size	k	is	a	k-dimensional	family	of	statistical	hypotheses.	To	give	some	tame	
	 4	
examples:	there	is	a	model	of	size	zero	comprising	just	the	hypothesis	that	the	data	stream	 is	being	generated	by	 tossing	a	 fair	 coin;	 and	 there	 is	 a	model	of	 size	one,	that	includes	for	each	p	between	zero	and	one	the	hypothesis	that	the	data	stream	is	being	 generated	 by	 tossing	 a	 coin	 with	 bias	 p	 in	 favour	 of	 heads;	 and	 there	 is	 a	model	 of	 size	 two,	 that	 includes	 for	 each	 p1	 and	 p2	 between	 zero	 and	 one,	 the	hypothesis	that	the	data	stream	is	being	generated	by	alternating	between	tossing	a	coin	 with	 bias	 p1	 in	 favour	 of	 heads	 and	 tossing	 a	 coin	 with	 bias	 p2	 in	 favour	 of	heads.			A	method	of	model	selection	is	a	rule	that	takes	as	input	a	list	of	models	and	a	data	set	 and	 gives	 as	 output	 one	 of	 the	 models	 under	 consideration.	 A	 paradigmatic	example	is	the	Akaike	Information	Criterion	(AIC):	
AIC.	For	each	model	M	under	consideration,	calculate	for	each	hypothesis	in	the	model	 how	 likely	 the	 data	 seen	 is	 relative	 to	 that	 hypothesis.	 Call	 the	maximum	such	number	L(M).	The	AIC	score	of	M	 is:	log	L(M)	–	k,	where	k	 is	the	size	of	M.	Select	the	model	with	the	highest	AIC	score.			Akaike	showed	that	the	AIC	score	has	a	remarkable	feature:	in	the	limit	of	large	data	sets,	 the	 AIC	 score	 of	 a	 model	 provides	 an	 unbiased	 estimate	 of	 the	 predictive	accuracy	of	the	model.	(What	does	predictive	accuracy	mean	here?	For	any	model	M	and	any	(n+1)-tuple	(x1,	…,	xn,	y)	of	data	points,	we	imagine	that	(x1,	…,	xn)	is	our	data	set,	find	the	statistical	hypothesis	θ0	in		M	that	confers	maximum	likelihood	on	that	data	set,	and	find	the	probability	p	that	θ0	assigns	to	the	next	bit	seen	being	a	one.	Then	(y	–	p)2	is	the	loss	for	M	relative	to	(x1,	…,	xn,	y).	We	are	working	in	a	context	in	which	 data	 sets	 are	 chosen	 randomly	 in	 accord	 with	 some	 underlying	 statistical	hypothesis	Θ	 lying	 in	 one	 of	 the	models	 under	 consideration.	 And	 	we	 know,	 for	each	way	(x1,	…,	xn,	y)	could	be	chosen	randomly,	what	the	loss	of	M	would	be.	So	we	can	 take	 the	expectation	value	relative	 to	Θ	of	 the	 loss	of	M.	That	 is	 the	predictive	
accuracy	 of	 M	 for	 an	 n-point	 data	 set.	 Akaike’s	 result	 says	 that,	 normalizing	constants	aside,	as	n→∞,	this	quantity	is	approximated	by	the	AIC	score	of	M.)		Why	does	the	AIC	score	work	so	well?	It	can	be	thought	of	as	weighing	the	size	of	a	model	 against	 the	 ability	 of	 that	 model	 to	 fit	 current	 data.	 This	 is	 a	 reasonable	strategy	because	the	more	parameters	a	model	has	the	easier	it	is	for	it	to	fit	a	given	data	 set—so	 a	 given	degree	 of	 fit	 is	 not	 equally	 impressive	 in	models	 of	 different	sizes.	The	trick	 is	to	 find	the	right	way	to	weigh	size	against	 fit	of	current	data.	As	Sober	 remarks,	 “AIC	 doesn’t	 tell	 you	 to	 throw	 up	 your	 hands	 and	 say	 that	 it	 is	 a	matter	 of	 subjective	 preference	 how	much	 parsimony	matters	 as	 compared	 with	fitting	 the	 data.	 No,	 the	 criterion	 says	 that	 these	 two	 considerations	 are	commensurable	and	tells	you	how	to	commensurate	them”	(148).			In	explaining	what	it	would	mean	for	parsimony	to	be	epistemically	relevant,	Sober	identifies	as	one	relevant	question	whether	“the	fact	that	S	is	simpler	than	C	[helps	to]	justify	the	claim	that	S	will	make	more	accurate	predictions	in	the	future	than	C	will”	 (59).	 And	 in	 light	 of	 the	 sort	 of	 result	 mentioned	 above	 regarding	 the	
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asymptotic	 behaviour	 of	 AIC,	 it	 would	 appear	 that	 an	 affirmative	 answer	 is	unavoidable	 here—“parsimony	 is	 relevant	 because	 the	 number	 of	 adjustable	parameters	in	a	model	helps	you	estimate	its	predictive	accuracy”	(141).				So	we	appear	to	have	an	argument	for	the	relevance	of	parsimony	to	the	problem	of	model	selection:	AIC	 has	 a	 certain	 desirable	 asymptotic	 behaviour	 in	 regard	 to	 predictive	accuracy.	 So	 AIC	 is	 a	 good	 method	 of	 model	 selection	 when	 we	 value	predictive	accuracy.	In	implementing	AIC,	one	takes	model	size	into	account.	So	parsimony	is	epistemically	relevant	 in	the	context	of	model	selection	for	the	purpose	of	predictive	accuracy.			A	DILEMMA		This	argument	for	the	relevance	of	parsimony	has	an	evil	twin,	standing	to	it	as	our	argument	 for	 the	 relevance	 of	 order	 stood	 to	 our	 argument	 for	 the	 irrelevance	 of	order	in	the	problem	of	the	biased	coin.			Consider	a	widely-used	alternative	to	AIC,	cross-validation	(CV).	CV.	Fix	a	model	M	and	n-point	data	set	S=(x1,	…,	xn).	Let		S(1)	be	the	(n-1)-point	data	set	that	results	from	dropping	x1	from	S.	Choose	the	hypothesis	in	M	that	confers	maximum	 likelihood	 on	 S(1)	 and	 let	 p1	 be	 the	 probability	 that	 that	hypothesis	confers	on	the	missing	data	point	x1	and	let	 	d1	be	the	square	of	the	 difference	 between	 p1	 and	 the	 actual	 value	 of	 the	 missing	 data	 point.	Likewise	define	S(i),	pi,	and	di	for	each	i=2,	…,	n.	The	CV	score	of	the	model	is	sum	d1+…+dn.	Select	the	model	with	the	smallest	CV	score.			As	Sober	notes	 (133	 fn.	52),	 although	CV	 “makes	no	overt	use	of	parsimony,”	 it	 is	known	 that	 for	 a	 wide	 class	 of	 model	 selection	 problems,	 AIC	 and	 CV	 are	asymptotically	 equivalent	 to	 one	 another—for	 sufficiently	 large	 data	 sets,	 they	always	select	the	same	model.			So	in	the	limit	of	large	data	sets,	following	CV	is	as	good	a	strategy	as	following	AIC	(since	the	two	strategies	select	exactly	the	same	models).	So	if	the	fact	that	the	AIC	score	is	a	good	asymptotic	estimator	of	predictive	accurcy	implies	that	AIC	is	a	good	method	of	model	selection	in	the	limit	of	large	data	sets,	then	following	CV	is	also	a	good	method	in	that	regime.			So	 if	 the	 argument	 given	 above	 for	 the	 epistemic	 relevance	 of	 parsimony	 to	predictive	 accuracy	 is	 sound,	 so	 is	 the	 following	 argument	 for	 the	 epistemic	irrelevance	of	parsimony.		CV	 has	 a	 certain	 desirable	 asymptotic	 behaviour	 in	 regard	 to	 predictive	accuracy.	 So	 CV	 is	 a	 good	 method	 of	 model	 selection	 when	 we	 value	predictive	accuracy.	 In	 implementing	CV,	one	does	not	 take	model	size	 into	
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account.	 So	 parsimony	 is	 epistemically	 irrelevant	 in	 the	 context	 of	 model	selection	for	the	purpose	of	predictive	accuracy.		We	have	landed	in	the	same	sort	of	situation	as	in	the	case	of	the	biased	coin.	We	are	in	danger	of	being	forced	to	accept	that	parsimony	is	both	relevant	and	irrelevant	to	predictive	accuracy	in	model	selection.			The	 most	 attractive	 route	 to	 avoiding	 this	 conclusion	 proceeds	 via	 denying	 that	good	asymptotic	behaviour	is	sufficient	for	a	method	of	model	selection	to	be	good.			Careful	 readers	 (and	 authors!)	 of	 Sober’s	 work	 will	 be	 justifiably	 impatient	 to	observe	that	there	is	a	passage	in	Ockham’s	Razors	that	makes	just	this	move:	on	pp.	132	f.,	Sober	notes	that	Akaike’s	result	concerning	the	asymptotic	relation	between	expected	predictive	accuracy	and	the	AIC	score	 leaves	open	questions	about	other	aspects	of	the	behaviour	of	AIC	(e.g.,	it	could	be	pathologically	erratic	in	the	sense	of	having	high	variance),	and	concludes	that	“Akaike’s	result,	by	itself,	does	not	suffice	to	 justify	 your	 using	 AIC.	 This,	 of	 course,	 leaves	 it	 open	 that	 there	 are	 other	mathematical	results	that	close	the	gap”	(see	also	Sober	2008,	87).			From	this	perspective,	 it	 is	at	present	an	open	question	either	AIC	or	CV	 is	a	good	method	of	model	selection.	In	one	sense,	that	is	promising	for	Sober’s	project—if	it	should	 turn	 out	 that	 all	 good	 methods	 of	 model	 selection	 take	 model	 size	 into	account,	 then	we	 could	 say	 that	 parsimony	 is	 epistemically	 relevant	without	 also	having	to	say	that	opposite.			But	 in	 the	 meantime,	 it	 leaves	 us	 able	 only	 to	 assert	 very	 weak	 conditional	conclusions:	 if	 future	 discoveries	 determine	 that	 all	 good	 methods	 of	 model	selection	 are	 like	 AIC	 rather	 than	 CV,	 then	 parsimony	 is	 epistemically	 relevant	 to	model	selection	for	predictive	accuracy—but	if	all	good	methods	are	like	CV	rather	than	AIC,	 then	parsimony	 is	epistemically	 irrelevant.	These	are	much	weaker	 than	the	verdicts	handed	down	by	Sober	in	Ockham’s	Razors.		Worse:	 as	 in	 the	 biased	 coin	 case,	 there	 is	 ample	 room	 doubt	 that	 results	 will	emerge	that	serve	to	single	out	a	determinate	elite	class	of	good	methods	for	model	selection	that	agree	as	to	questions	like	the	relevance	of	parsimony.	On	the	question	of	efficiency,	for	instance,	the	situation	is	reminiscent	of	the	biased	coin	case:	there	is	a	sense	in	which	AIC	is	an	especially	efficient	method;	and	across	a	wide	range	of	situations,	 AIC	 and	 CV	 are	 known	 to	 be	 equivalently	 efficient	 in	 that	 sense	 (Shao	1997).			I	claim,	then,	that	Sober	faces	a	choice:	either	accept	that	parsimony	is	both	relevant	and	irrelevant	to	model	selection;	or	allow	that	as	things	stand	we	have	no	grounds	for	claiming	either	that	parsimony	is	relevant	or	that	it	is	irrelevant.	That	is:	either	render	a	verdict	of	both	guilty	and	not	guilty	or	a	verdict	of	not	proven.					
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